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STOP REGULATING GOVERNMENT 
PAPERWORK WITH MORE GOVERNMENT 
PAPERWORK 
Joseph D. Condon* 
The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) is an often-ignored law with a large impact. 
Federal agencies cannot ask the same questions of more than nine people or entities 
without submitting a proposed information collection to the White House Office of 
Management and Budget for review, a process that can take up to a year to complete. In 
an attempt to regulate the amount of paperwork foisted on the public, the PRA has created 
an enormous amount of paperwork for federal agencies—without any meaningful 
reduction in the paperwork burden faced by the public. Yet, likely because the burden of 
the PRA is borne primarily within agencies themselves, this law has gone relatively 
understudied by legal academics. This note considers the PRA—its history, purpose, 
functions, benefits and costs—and concludes that the PRA should be largely eliminated. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 214 
 I. WHY REGULATE PAPERWORK? ...............................................215 
A. The Burden of Government Paperwork .................................. 216 
B. Government Information Collection Needs .............................. 219 
C. A Brief History of Paperwork Regulation ................................ 220 
 II. THE OPERATION AND EFFECTS OF THE  PAPERWORK 
REDUCTION ACT ................................................................... 223 
A. The Operation of the Paperwork Reduction Act ........................ 223 
1. Agencies and Information Collections Covered ............ 223 
2. Agency Requirements for OMB Approval ................... 226 
B. Effectiveness of the Paperwork Reduction Act .......................... 228 
C. The Burden of the Paperwork Reduction Act on Agencies and  
the Public .......................................................................... 230 
1. Direct Costs ............................................................... 231 
2. Costs from Delay ....................................................... 231 
3. Costs from Forgone Information Collection ................ 232 
4.  The PRA as a Political Tool ........................................ 233 
 III.  PROPOSALS FOR REFORM ...................................................... 235 
 
 * University of Michigan Law School, J.D. Candidate, 2020. I am grateful to Julie Aust, Kev-
in Todd, David Treadaway, and Matthew Meyerhuber for their insightful comments and critiques of 
many drafts of this Note, and to the rest of the MJEAL staff for their edits and efforts. Additional 
thanks to Professor Nicholas Bagley, Dana Paikowsky, my former colleagues, and too many others to 
name for their ideas and encouragement. 
_JCI_CONDON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2020  4:18 PM 
214 Michigan Journal of Administrative & Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
 
A. Prior Proposals for Reform .................................................... 235 
1. Arguments for Modifying the PRA Regime to  
Add Enforcement ....................................................... 235 
2. Arguments for Modifying the PRA Regime to   
Reduce the Burden on Agency Functioning ................. 238 
B. Eliminating the Paperwork Reduction Act .............................. 240 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) has the sort of name that anyone can 
get behind. No one likes paperwork. We should have less of it. The PRA goes 
about this goal by requiring agencies to run through an approval process for any 
information collection that involves asking more than nine people the same set of 
questions.1 Agencies submit a package to the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) within the White House Office of Management and Budget with a 
justification and estimate of the public burden.2 OIRA considers the proposal 
along with submitted public comments, and either rejects the request or approves 
it for up to three years.3 
This process is intended to force agencies to think carefully about the burdens 
they impose on the public in the form of surveys, reporting requirements, and the 
like.4 It centralizes approval to discourage duplicative paperwork across agencies. 
The intended effect is to reduce the paperwork burden on the public.5 
Unfortunately, the PRA has not had this effect. In its thirty-seven years in ex-
istence, the paperwork burden imposed on the American public has grown substan-
tially.6 The causes of this growth—a growing population, increased economic activ-
ity, new information burdens established by Congress—are well beyond the reach 
of the agencies constrained by the PRA.7 As this Note will argue, the benefits that 
are associated with the PRA are minimal and largely secondary effects of the re-
view process—not the significant constraint on government paperwork that its 
drafters imagined. 
 
 1. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3)(A)(i) (2017). 
 2. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3503-3504, 3506-3507 (2017). 
 3. Id. 
 4. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2017). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. AND REG. AFFAIRS, 2016 
INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 2 (showing an increas-
ing paperwork burden between FY2004 and FY2015). 
 7. E.g., discussion of tax return lobbying infra Section I.A. 
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The PRA has introduced a significant paperwork burden on federal agencies. 
The process of developing and submitting a package to OIRA can take six months 
to a year.8 In my experience as a former government researcher, I worked on pro-
jects involving PRA surveys that stretched out over several years to comply with 
the OIRA approval process for sampled surveys.9 I also worked on projects that, 
although they would have been substantially improved through the use of a survey, 
relied instead on individual and anecdotal interviews to draw conclusions.10 This 
delay, although purposeful, forces agencies to forgo useful information collection, 
delay actions that would support useful rulemaking, and inhibit program improve-
ments that would meaningfully improve government functioning. 
This note will proceed in three parts. Part I considers the background of the 
PRA. This includes the burden of paperwork and administrative reporting on the 
public, the government need for data and information collection, and a brief histo-
ry of the legislation that has developed into the modern PRA. Part II discusses the 
operation and effects of the PRA. After developing a working understanding of the 
functioning of the PRA review process, this Part discusses the benefits and bur-
dens of the law as it currently functions with respect to agencies and the public. I 
conclude that the costs of the PRA outweigh the benefits. Finally, Part III consid-
ers proposals for reform, and recommends largely eliminating the PRA. 
I.  WHY REGULATE PAPERWORK? 
Necessary though it may be, paperwork is a drag. It is a transaction cost and a 
deadweight loss: something inherently inefficient.11 Generally speaking, people do 
not enjoy or value filling out paperwork.12 
Nevertheless, information collection is one of the core functions of govern-
ment.13 This information collection frequently takes the form of paperwork: re-
 
 8. Estimates of delay vary. Based on the timeframes included in statute, PRA approval adds 
four months to a collection. See 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (2017). However, this does not include required re-
view internal to an agency or time spent preparing a package for review by OIRA. One study involving 
interviews with a range of federal researchers put average delay at six to nine months. STUART 
SHAPIRO, THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT: RESEARCH ON CURRENT PRACTICES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 51 (2012). The rule of thumb in the author’s former agency was to 
add a year to a project schedule to incorporate agency and OIRA approval of a statistical survey. 
 9. Author’s personal experience working in a federal agency. 
 10. Author’s personal experience working in a federal agency. 
 11. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L. J. 1409, 1419-20 (2015); see also Cost, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 12. See Emens, supra note 11, at 1420. This is especially true if the ultimate goal of that paper-
work is to facilitate the regulation of your business. See, e.g., A. O. Smith Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
530 F.2d 515, 528 (3d Cir. 1976) (though the court denied an injunction, it acknowledged that “[a]ny 
time a corporation complies with a government regulation that requires corporation action, [the corpo-
ration] spends money and loses profits”). 
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quests for information directed at members of the public. Many of the public’s in-
teractions with government involve paperwork: filing taxes, applying for licenses, 
filling out Census forms, et cetera. For industry, one of the core forms of govern-
ment regulation is a myriad of reporting requirements. 
It should come as no surprise, then, that elected officials have worked hard to 
constrain, control, and eliminate paperwork, or “red tape.”14 It is the rare lobby re-
questing an additional paperwork requirement for their constituency. Multiple 
Presidents have emphasized eliminating paperwork as a goal of their administra-
tion.15 Congress has also attempted to legislatively regulate government paper-
work. Most notably, in 1980 Congress passed the Paperwork Reduction Act 
(PRA), and has revised it three times since.16 
The PRA attempts to regulate paperwork with additional paperwork. The 
PRA created a new bureaucratic organ, the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA),17 and established a process through which agencies seek OIRA 
clearance before submitting a request for information.18 This process is intended to 
force agencies to consider the costs of their information requests and provide for 
centralized coordination between agencies.19 The PRA framework was developed 
in response to a history of constituent frustration with government paperwork 
driving political action.20 
This Part will provide some background on federal government paperwork: its 
costs, its benefits, and a brief history of attempts to regulate it. 
A.  The Burden of Government Paperwork 
Americans spend a great deal of time filling out paperwork from a variety of 
sources—much of it from corporations and not-for-profits we do business with, 
and another significant portion of it from state and local governments. Much of 
that time and effort (that is to say, the cost of paperwork) is not well document-
 
 13. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned 
among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers . . . . The actual Enumeration shall 
be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within 
every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.”); see also William F. 
Funk, The Paperwork Reduction Act: Paperwork Reduction Meets Administrative Law, 24 HARV. J. LEGIS. 
1, 2 (1987) (“The eleventh law passed by the First Congress of the United States imposed a paperwork 
requirement, the documentation of marine vessels.”) 
 14. See Funk, supra note 13, at 26-30. 
 15. See generally id. 
 16. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2017). 
 17. 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (2017). 
 18. See 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (2017). 
 19. See Funk, supra note 13, at 33-34. 
 20. See id. at 13-14. 
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ed.21 Professor Richard Thaler has characterized the government-related portion of 
this administrative work as “sludge,” or obstacles that diminish the effectiveness of 
programs by erecting barriers to participation.22 
The burden of paperwork on citizens is not distributed evenly. Professor Eliz-
abeth Emens notes that burdens of personal paperwork vary by socioeconomic sta-
tus and gender.23 Poor people face a disproportionate paperwork burden, as most 
governmental assistance programs have onerous paperwork requirements.24 Indi-
viduals with means have better access to outsource this type of labor.25 Professor 
Emens notes that marginalized groups tend to face higher administrative costs, 
such as the burdens placed on transgender individuals who seek government 
recognition of their identity,26 or burdens faced by same-sex married couples prior 
to Obergefell v. Hodges.27 
The PRA, however, requires estimation of the burdens imposed by federal in-
formation collection.28 Historically, this cost is measured as “burden hours.”29 The 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), part of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB), estimated the total burden of federal paperwork in 
the 2015 fiscal year at 9.78 billion hours—an increase of 350 million hours from the 
 
 21. See Emens, supra note 11, at 1414-15 (explaining how the federal government uniquely tracks 
administrative cost as opposed to other sectors of society). 
 22. Richard H. Thaler, Nudge, Not Sludge, 361 SCIENCE 431 (2018). 
 23. Emens, supra note 11, at 1427, 1440-43. 
 24. See KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING 
IN AMERICA 2 (2015) (“One way the poor pay for government aid is with their time.”). 
 25. Emens, supra note 11, at 1427-28. 
 26. Id. at 1413. 
 27. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that same sex marriage is constitutional). 
 28. See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A)(iv) (2012) (requiring agency heads to include “a specific, 
objectively supported estimate of burden” in proposals to OMB); 44 U.S.C. §3502(2) (2012) (“the term 
‘burden’ means time, effort, or financial resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, or pro-
vide information to or for a Federal agency”). 
 29. Funk, supra note 13, at 22-23. 
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prior year.30 This burden is felt by businesses, nonprofits, individuals, and house-
holds.31 
The total economic cost of federal government paperwork, including equip-
ment, recordkeeping, labor, and opportunity cost, is not as well documented. For 
instance, as noted by Professor Adam Samaha, while government monetization of 
lives saved is commonplace for purposes of cost-benefit analysis, the monetization 
of information collection burden occurs sporadically and without specific guidance 
from OMB.32 Since the 1980s, the Federal Government has applied cost-benefit 
analyses to new rulemakings and regulations, such that new rulemakings are almost 
certainly cost-beneficial.33 Information collections, however, do not have to pass a 
similar economic test. For instance, the IRS estimates the total burden of the 1040 
individual income tax form is 1.97 billion hours (thereby accounting for nearly a 
fifth of the entire federal paperwork burden).34 However, the IRS only provides 
estimates of the financial cost of tax preparation, such as the costs of recordkeep-
ing, tax preparation software, accounting services and the like; it does not monetize 
this estimate of burden hours.35 
Tax preparation also provides an opportunity to consider the source of some 
federal government paperwork burden. Some federal paperwork burden comes 
from poorly thought-out forms or ineffective recordkeeping systems in the federal 
government—the sort of thing the PRA is designed to address.36 But much federal 
information collection is driven by Congressional mandate, and there are reasons 
beyond mere administrative sloth that those systems remain burdensome. Some 
interests benefit from federal burdens, and Congress is sometimes willing to coop-
 
 30. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at i. Be-
cause this statistic is published in connection with the PRA, it excludes paperwork generated by agen-
cies not covered by the PRA. For comparison, Americans worked around 285 billion hours in 2016. 
Author’s calculation; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Table B-2, https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/empsit.t18.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2020) (average weekly hours and overtime of all em-
ployees on private nonfarm payrolls by industry sector, seasonally adjusted); Average Weekly Hours, 
retrieved from ECONOMIC RESEARCH, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AWHAETP (last visited Nov. 11, 2018); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, Civilian Labor Force, retrieved from FRED, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CLF16OV (last visited Nov. 11, 2018). 
 31. See 44 U.S.C. § 3501(1) (2012). One study found that approximately 21% of information 
collection requests implicated individuals and households. See Emens, supra note 11, at 1464 n. 235 
(2015). 
 32. Adam M. Samaha, Death and Paperwork Reduction, 65 DUKE L. J. 279 (2015). 
 33. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 3-26 (2018) (describ-
ing what Professor Sunstein characterizes as a “revolution” in the application of cost-benefit analysis to 
policymaking). 
 34. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SUPPORTING STATEMENT U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
RETURN, OMB Control No. 1545-0074 (2018), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/Download
Document?objectID=85809800. 
 35. See Samaha, supra note 32, at 295. 
 36. See discussion of the operation of the PRA, infra Section II.A. 
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erate. For example, a substantial and winning lobbying effort by members of the 
tax preparation industry has encouraged Congress to slow or prevent changes that 
would reduce the burden associated with filing personal income tax returns.37 
B.  Government Information Collection Needs 
Paperwork is a means to an end.38 Although some paperwork may lack inher-
ent benefits, it generates critical secondary benefits.39 The regulation and organiza-
tion of society and industry requires that the government know something about 
what it seeks to regulate. Indeed, the information needs of governments have 
shaped fundamental aspects of our society.40 
In the case of federal information collection, a great deal is required by statute 
or, in the case of the Census, the Constitution. Federal agencies have a good deal 
of discretion regarding the design of information requests, such as whether to use 
electronic forms or which populations to target, that impact the overall burden of 
the collection. However, they are ultimately constrained by the dictates of Con-
gress, so many burdens are unavoidable.41 
Federal information collection takes many forms. The PRA defines the “col-
lection of information” as “obtaining, causing to be obtained, soliciting, or requir-
ing the disclosure to third parties or the public, of facts or opinions by or for an 
agency.”42 Perhaps most notably, the decennial census and other information col-
lections conducted by the Census Bureau make up a significant portion of statisti-
cal collection by the federal government. Many other agencies conduct research or 
statistical reporting that requires information collection from the public. As noted 
above, tax collection represents an enormous portion of total federal paperwork.43 
Applications for government assistance, such as the Free Application for Federal 
Student Aid (FAFSA), are covered by the PRA.44 Many agencies, such as the U.S. 
 
 37. See Libby Watson, How Big-Money Lobbying is Making Tax Day Even More Complicated, 
SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (Apr. 13, 2016), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2016/04/13/how-big-money-
lobbying-is-making-tax-day-even-more-complicated/. 
 38. See Emens, supra note 11, at 1420. 
 39. For instance, the Census provides data used in innumerable research studies, in addition to 
supporting basic government functions. 
 40. See, e.g., JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE 64-71 (1998) (describing state need to 
develop surnames of individuals for purposes of tax collection schemes, among others in 13th century 
England, 4th century China and 17th century Tuscany). 
 41. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 2 
n.8, 2-6 (discussing that most of the burden hours fall within the agency, but most of the increases in 
burden hours are not due to agency discretion); see also Samaha, supra note 32, at 314 n.154. 
 42. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3) (2017). 
 43. See, e.g., 83 Fed. Reg. 51565 (Oct 11, 2018) (notice to public regarding Department of 
Treasury’s submission to OMB for review and clearance in accordance with PRA). 
 44. E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Free Application for Federal Student Aid 2 (2018), 
https://fafsa.ed.gov/fotw1819/pdf/PdfFafsa18-19.pdf. 
_JCI_CONDON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2020  4:18 PM 
220 Michigan Journal of Administrative & Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
 
Department of Transportation, maintain licensing and registration databases that 
require information collection.45 Additionally, the federal government requires ap-
plications and data collection when administering a wide variety of grant pro-
grams.46 Information used to support the evaluation of government programs, such 
as customer experience surveys and the like, is often covered.47 
Naturally, information collection includes survey research, which can be used 
to inform rulemaking, the cost-benefit analysis used to support rulemaking, or gov-
ernance goals such as program evaluation or strategic planning.48 The requirements 
of the PRA can also apply to any required exchanges of information between pri-
vate parties (such as food labeling) and recordkeeping requirements of private par-
ties (such as workplace incident reports).49 
C.  A Brief History of Paperwork Regulation 
The federal government’s attempts to restrain its imposition of paperwork 
date back over eighty years. In 1938, President Franklin Roosevelt ordered a study 
from the Central Statistical Board on the volume of statistical reports requested by 
the federal government from businesses.50 In part because of the recommendations 
of this study, and because of the growing burdens of information collection gener-
ated by the wartime government,51 Congress passed the Federal Reports Act of 
1942.52 This bill formed the basis of what would later become the Paperwork Re-
duction Act. 
The Federal Reports Act placed the burden on agencies to reduce the burdens 
they imposed on the public through information collection.53 The Federal Reports 
Act positioned the Bureau of the Budget (BoB), the predecessor to the modern 
 
 45. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp., Unified Registration System, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Ad-
min. (2019), https://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/registration (discussing submission of personal information for 
registration purposes). 
 46. See NATALIE KEEGAN, FEDERAL GRANT FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND 
DATABASES FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 2 (2016) (“[F]ederal agen-
cies that administer federal grant programs must collect and report financial grant data to federal grant 
databases”). 
 47. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL APPEALS DIVISION CUSTOMER SERVICE 
SURVEY, OMB Control No. 0503-0007, October 31, 2017, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201708-0503-002. 
 48. See, e.g., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., GENERAL AVIATION AND PART 135 ACTIVITY SURVEY 
SUPPORTING STATEMENT A, OMB Control Number 2120-0060 (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/DownloadDocument?objectID=83338601. 
 49. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3)(A) (2012); Samaha, supra note 32, at 286. 
 50. See Funk, supra note 13, at 7-8. 
 51. See id. at 8. 
 52. See Pub. L. No. 77-831, 56 Stat. 1078 (1942) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-
3520 (2012)). 
 53. See Funk, supra note 13, at 10. 
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OMB,54 as a central check on agency information collection.55 As in the modern 
regime, all information collections, defined as identical requests for information 
required of 10 or more individuals, required approval from BoB.56 This included 
both statutorily required information collection and collections where participation 
was voluntary. Significantly, the Federal Reports Act exempted a wider swath of 
agencies from review than later legislation.57 
Over time, however, the paperwork-filing public complained that the Federal 
Reports Act was ineffective at reducing the burden of federal paperwork.58 In par-
ticular, business groups raised concerns regarding information requests from the 
FTC that would have required significant changes to recordkeeping practices.59 
Companies attempted to challenge agencies in court over their adherence to the 
Federal Reports Act, but were largely unsuccessful.60 
Constituent complaints about government paperwork brought two reforms in 
the 1970s.61 The first was the concept of the “Information Collection Budget,” 
where agencies were encouraged to adhere to a limited number of information col-
lections. President Gerald Ford set goals for reducing the number of reports that 
the federal government required of businesses. His effort was successful in reduc-
ing total reports, but was accompanied by an increase in burden hours.62 Focus 
then shifted to burden hours. In a 1979 Executive Order, President Carter formally 
adopted the Information Collection Budget, which tasked each agency with devel-
oping a budget for information collection burden hours.63 OMB was to conduct 
annual reviews of information collection requests, with the goal of capping and re-
ducing the burden imposed by government paperwork.64 
The second reform was a national Commission on Paperwork.65 The resulting 
Commission report, released in 1977,66 provided the impetus for congressional ac-
tion to update the Federal Reports Act. The ensuing legislation was the Paperwork 
 
 54. See Exec. Order 11,541, 3 C.F.R. 939 (1966-1970) (delegating power from the BoB to 
OMB). 
 55. See Funk, supra note 13, at 8. 
 56. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2017). 
 57. See id. (exempting the Treasury and other financial agencies from review). 
 58. See Funk, supra note 13, at 14-15. 
 59. See id. at 17-18. 
 60. See id. at 18-20. 
 61. See id. at 20, 23. 
 62. See id. at 24. 
 63. Exec. Order 12,174, 49 Fed. Reg. 69,609 (Dec. 4, 1979). 
 64. See Funk, supra note 13, at 23-25. This system remains in place today, despite not being 
codified in statute. See id. 
 65. See Funk, supra note 13, at 21. Created by Congress via Pub. L. No. 93-556, 88 Stat. 1789 
(1974). 
 66. COMM’N OF FED. PAPERWORK, FINAL SUMMARY REPORT (Oct. 3, 1977). 
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Reduction Act of 1980.67 The PRA created the OIRA within OMB to centralize 
control of information collection.68 It significantly increased the range of agencies 
subject to OMB review, both by bringing the IRS and other financial agencies 
within OMB’s ambit69 and by expanding the definition of information collection.70 
The PRA also added a public protection provision that exempted the public from 
penalties for failure to respond to expired or non-cleared requests,71 and added 
statutory deadlines for agencies to bring existing regulations into compliance.72 
By the early 1990s, the cycle had repeated itself. The business community 
again complained of an overabundance of government paperwork.73 In 1995, Con-
gress responded with an updated Paperwork Reduction Act.74 The revamped Act, a 
completely reenacted version of the legislation, once again expanded the definition 
of both information and collection.75 The legislation also strengthened the clear-
ance process by empowering OIRA with more criteria on which to approve or dis-
approve collections, and increased the information that agencies must supply with 
proposed collections.76 
The most recent statutory change to the PRA was the Information Quality 
Act (IQA), enacted in 2001.77 The IQA was a small addendum to a consolidated 
appropriations bill that directed OMB to develop standards for statistical infor-
mation used, collected and distributed by the federal government.78 The provision 
was met with concern by those who viewed it as designed to hinder environmental 
rulemaking, eliciting worries that it would create more opportunities to challenge 
 
 67. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 
(2012)). 
 68. 44 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(C)(2) (2017). 
 69. Funk, supra note 13, at 31, 36. 
 70. Compare Pub. L. No. 77-831 § 5, 56 Stat. 1078 at 1079 (1942) (codified as amended at 44 
U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2012)), with 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3) (2012) (defining “collection of information.”); 
See also Funk, supra note 13, at 31-32. 
 71. 44 U.S.C. § 3512 (2017). 
 72. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2818 (1980). 
 73. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Recent Developments: Regulatory Reform & The 104th Congress: Paperwork 
Redux: The (Stronger) Paperwork Reduction Act Of 1995, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 111, 113 (1997). 
 74. Pub. L. 104-13, 109 Stat. 176 (1995) (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 
(2012)). 
 75. Lubbers, supra note 73, at 118-19. 
 76. See id. at 117. 
 77. Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 515, 114 Stat. 2763A-153-54 (2001). 
 78. Id. 
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government action.79 While OMB has issued guidelines on data quality, the overall 
impact of the provision is not yet clear.80 
II.  THE OPERATION AND EFFECTS OF THE  
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT 
The central irony of the PRA is that it seeks to reduce the burden of paper-
work on the public by imposing the burden of paperwork on federal agencies. This 
Part will discuss 1) the operation and function of the PRA, 2) the effectiveness of 
the PRA at reducing public paperwork burden, and 3) the effects of the PRA on 
agency operations. 
A.  The Operation of the Paperwork Reduction Act 
At its core, the PRA requires notice and comment and OMB approval for “in-
formation collections” conducted by covered agencies.81 
1.  Agencies and Information Collections Covered 
As discussed above, the number of agencies covered by the PRA has grown 
over time.82 Today, the PRA covers every executive agency, military department, 
government corporation or government-controlled corporation, and independent 
regulatory agency, with four exceptions: the General Accounting Office (GAO), 
the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the governments of the District of Co-
lumbia and other federal territories and possessions, and government-owned con-
tractor-operated facilities such as national laboratories.83 The requirements of the 
PRA apply even to agencies that are not covered by OIRA review of cost-benefit 
analysis.84 Independent regulatory agencies do, however, retain the power to reject 
a disapproval by the OMB director by majority vote.85 
 
 79. Tammy P. Tideswell, The Information Quality Act: An Environmental Primer, 51 NAVAL L. 
REV. 91-92 (2005). 
 80. Id. at 96-97. Since the IQA’s adoption in 2001, there has been only one study of its effects 
on federal rulemaking, whose results were inconclusive but whose prognosis was that it would hinder or 
discourage rulemaking where agencies did not wish to subject themselves to IQA scrutiny. Id. at 97. 
 81. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3506-3508 (2017). 
 82. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
 83. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1) (2017). 
 84. Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 “Regulatory Planning and Review” at § 3(b) 
(Sept. 30, 1993). Because of the PRA, then, a rulemaking that is otherwise exempt from OIRA benefit-
cost review but requires information collection as defined by the PRA and its attendant regulations 
must still receive OMB clearance. 
 85. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(f). After extensive research, the author has been unable to find an instance 
of an independent agency rejecting the determination of the OMB director on this point. 
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The Director of OMB has the power to delegate authority to a senior agency 
official to manage that agency’s information collection processes.86 If a senior 
agency official is deemed by OMB to be “sufficiently independent of program re-
sponsibility to evaluate fairly whether proposed collections of information should 
be approved,” and has the resources to conduct those evaluations, the OMB direc-
tor can make a revocable delegation via notice-and-comment rulemaking.87 At pre-
sent, OMB has delegated such power to two independent regulatory agencies: the 
Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).88 
The PRA defines information collection broadly. At its most basic, if an agen-
cy wants to ask identical questions of more than ten persons, it must receive clear-
ance from OIRA.89 “Persons” not only includes actual individuals, but also applies 
to legal persons, such as corporations, as well as state and local government enti-
ties.90 The only category of person not included are “agencies, instrumentalities, or 
employees of the United States.”91 The PRA, it must be emphasized, is concerned 
solely with external paperwork burden on the public and offers no relief for a fed-
eral bureaucrat who finds herself drowning in mandatory forms. 
The PRA’s broad definition of information collection goes beyond the mere 
asking of questions on a form or survey, preventing agencies from getting around 
its requirements through technicalities. Recordkeeping requirements and required 
disclosures to the public or third parties qualify as information collections.92 Agen-
cies may not skirt PRA requirements by, for instance, directing contractors or 
grant recipients to collect information, or by partnering with a state agency.93 
The PRA provides some content-based exemptions to affected information 
collection activities. The statute exempts federal criminal investigations, civil ac-
tions, administrative actions or investigations against specific individuals, collec-
tions required by an antitrust statute, and collections for intelligence.94 In 2016, 
Congress exempted Inspectors General investigations and reviews from PRA re-
quirements.95 During the Obama administration, OMB itself issued guidance that 
exempted a handful of activities from categorization as information collection un-
 
 86. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(i); 5 C.F.R. 1320.16 (1997). 
 87. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(i). 
 88. 3 C.F.R. Pt. 1320 App. A (2008). 
 89. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3) (2017). 
 90. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10). 
 91. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3)(A)(i)-(ii). This exception does not extend to “questions posed to agen-
cies, instrumentalities, or employees of the United States which are to be used for general statistical 
purposes.” 
 92. 5 C.F.R. 1320.3(c) (2018). 
 93. See 5 C.F.R. § 1320.3(d). 
 94. 44 U.S.C. § 3518(c)(1) at 150 (2018). The exception for investigations does not apply to 
investigations targeting an industry or class. 44 U.S.C. § 3518(c)(2). 
 95. 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(k) (2016). 
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der the PRA. OMB clarified that certain social media uses, interactive web tools, 
and general requests for comment were not covered by the PRA.96 
Importantly, the PRA does not ask whether the target of an information col-
lection is compelled to respond.97 An agency must comply with the PRA even if 
response to its information collection is totally voluntary.98 The public policy ra-
tionale for scrutinizing compulsory information collection is quite clearly in line 
with the intent of the PRA. Extending that scrutiny to voluntary requests perhaps 
reflects an intent by Congress to limit the sort of soft power felt by regulated enti-
ties concerning requests from the federal government.99 If an agency does not 
comply with the PRA for a given information collection, the most significant con-
sequence is that the public may ignore the request without suffering any penalty 
that would ordinarily come from not complying with the information collection.100 
However, this applies only to that portion of information collections covered by 
the PRA that are compulsory for respondents.101 Information collections may face 
additional scrutiny if included as part of a rulemaking, although the analysis may 
not be as particular with regard to the form or information collection design.102 
The PRA also does not distinguish between information collection requests 
that are required by statute and those that are subject to agency discretion.103 
However, the criteria that OIRA uses to evaluate an information collection in-
cludes its purpose and necessity—meaning OIRA is not likely to deny a record-
keeping requirement that is based on specific statutory language.104 They could, 
 
 96. Memorandum from Cass Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Reg. Affairs, White House 
Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Social Media, Web-Based Interactive Technologies, and the Paperwork 
Reduction Act (Apr. 7, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/
inforeg/SocialMediaGuidance_04072010.pdf. 
 97. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3) (2018). 
 98. See id. The definition of “information collection” in the statute makes no distinction be-
tween compulsory and voluntary collections. 
 99. Indeed, some have described a sense of obligation to respond to government surveys by 
individuals (separate from regulated entities) as a justification for applying PRA requirements to volun-
tary collections. See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 30 (describing a sense of obligation to respond to gov-
ernment surveys by individuals (separate from regulated entities) as justification for applying PRA re-
quirements to voluntary collections). 
 100. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.6 (2019). 
 101. See id. If a survey is voluntary, the withholding of a penalty has no effect. 
 102. See Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993); 3 C.F.R. §§ 638, 640 (2018). 
Rulemakings that impose record keeping requirements will not have the specificity of an OIRA PRA 
package (such as a specific instrument design, etc.), but will still need to pass OMB cost-benefit review 
generally. 
 103. See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(3) (2017). 
 104. See 44 U.S.C. § 3506 (2017). 
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however, still require changes to ensure that it is developed and implemented in a 
minimally burdensome way.105 
2.  Agency Requirements for OMB Approval 
To proceed with an information collection, an agency must meet a number of 
requirements. Suppose the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), in support 
of a requirement imposed on it by Congress, wishes to survey state governments 
regarding their use of a particular definition of “serious injury” in traffic data.106 
The FHWA is a grantmaking agency that administers federal highway funds by 
distributing them to state governments.107 As such, its program implementation 
(for instance, promoting safe highway design or tracking performance) regularly 
requires the collection of information from state governments, which are “persons” 
covered by the PRA’s definition of information collection.108 To begin, FHWA 
must develop its request. Agency documentation must describe the desired infor-
mation, evaluate the need for collection, provide a plan for collection and the man-
agement of collected information, evaluate whether electronic collection techniques 
could reduce the burden on respondents, and, if appropriate, develop a pilot test of 
the instrument.109 FHWA must also provide a specific estimate of the burden, in-
cluding the time, effort, and money spent by states to generate, maintain, and dis-
close the requested information.110 In this example, because it is a relatively simple 
survey, the burden is fairly straightforward: the time needed to assemble the data 
and to respond, and the estimated number of respondents. 
FHWA will next submit its request to the Department of Transportation’s 
(DOT) Chief Information Officer (CIO).111 The PRA requires agencies to desig-
nate a CIO to oversee agency information collection activities, including evaluat-
ing information collection requests and managing information resources.112 The 
CIO may require alterations of the request from FHWA. Once revised and ap-
proved by the CIO, DOT must put out the proposed collection for a sixty-day no-
 
 105. One could imagine this being used to slow the implementation of a recordkeeping require-
ment that an administration is ideologically opposed to. See infra Section III.C.4. 
 106. This describes an information collection proposed by FHWA on September 28, 2018, pend-
ing as of this writing with OIRA. See Inventory of State Compliance on Serious Injury Reporting Us-
ing the Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria 4th Ed., ICR Reference No. 201806-2125-002, 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201806-2125-002 (last visited January 15, 
2019) [hereinafter Inventory of State Compliance]. 
 107. Who We Are, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., 
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/about/ (last modified Apr. 1, 2019). 
 108. See, e.g., Inventory of State Compliance, supra note 106. 
 109. 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A) (2017); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.8(a) (2018). 
 110. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.8(a)(4), 1320.3(b)(1). 
 111. See 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1). 
 112. Id. 
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tice and comment period in the Federal Register.113 Comments received must then 
be incorporated, which may involve more quibbling between the CIO and 
FHWA.114 
Once settled, the DOT CIO must certify that its request meets several criteria 
laid out by the PRA and OMB regulations.115 The request must include answers to 
eighteen questions for nonstatistical collection requests and twenty-three questions 
for statistical collections.116 Then, the DOT CIO may submit its request to OMB, 
and also publish notice of its request for approval in the Federal Register, designat-
ing a thirty-day window for the public to submit comments to OMB.117 Within 
sixty days, provided that the thirty-day comment window has elapsed, the OMB 
director must either approve, make a substantive or material change, deny the re-
quest, or direct FHWA to make a substantive or material change.118 If approved, 
OMB will provide DOT and FHWA with a control number to attach to the collec-
tion, which may be valid for up to three years.119 If OMB fails to take action, the 
request is presumed approved and OMB must provide a control number that may 
be valid for up to one year.120 If FHWA wishes to renew the information collec-
tion, it must go through the process again prior to expiration.121 
Together, the development and approval of an information collection can take 
from six months up to a year depending on departmental and OMB practices.122 
OIRA is generally regarded as short-staffed, having seen a reduction in headcount 
and budget as its responsibilities have grown along with the size of the administra-
tive state.123 OIRA is particularly rigorous in its review of survey methods and sta-
tistical research, often requiring additional rounds of instrument testing and high 
 
 113. 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2); 5 C.F.R. § 1320.8(d)(1). 
 114. This quibbling is likely to be informed by the DOT’s volume of requests. Because the CIO 
is responsible for ensuring that the Department as a whole is meeting its targets under the PRA, the 
CIO might dissuade certain information collections. At the very least, this step is another layer of re-
view adding time to the schedule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2018) (requiring that an agency incorporate com-
ments to a notice of proposed rulemaking). 
 115. 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(1)(A) (2017). 
 116. See Paperwork Reduction Act Submission, OMB Form 83-I, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/1868/OMB%2083-I%20%28Paperwork%20Reduction%20Act%20Submission
%29.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2019). 
 117. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.10(a) (2018). 
 118. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.10(b). 
 119. When relevant circumstances have changed or the burden estimates provided by the agency 
upon submission have changed, OMB may, at its discretion, review the information collection for bur-
den prior to the expiration of the control number. 5 C.F.R. 1320.10(b), (f). 
 120. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.10(c). 
 121. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.10(e). 
 122. See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 26. 
 123. John D. Graham & James W. Broughel, Stealth Regulation: Addressing Agency Evasion of 
OIRA and the Administrative Procedure Act, 1 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL’Y: FEDERALIST EDITION 30, 
35-36 (2014). 
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response rates for approval (despite significant scrutiny for monetary incentives to 
support responses).124 The overall effect for agencies is a lengthy process to collect 
information from the public. 
OMB does have a process for emergency information collection. The agency 
must provide a written determination that such an exigency exists, at which point 
it can publish a notice in the Federal Register and petition OMB for a short-term 
approval for up to 90 days.125 Given the length of this process, the Obama admin-
istration’s OMB issued guidance to promote the use of “general clearances,” which 
provide agencies with a means of obtaining quick approval for certain types of in-
formation collection.126 Fast-track requests generally apply to the collection of cus-
tomer feedback, such as visitor or website surveys and require an OMB response 
within five business days.127 
B.  Effectiveness of the Paperwork Reduction Act 
Has the PRA been successful at reducing the federal paperwork burden on the 
public? Generally speaking, no.128 While reasons for the ever-increasing paperwork 
burden are multi-faceted, the fact remains that the total paperwork burden driven 
by the federal government has increased from 6.97 billion to 9.78 billion hours 
since 1997.129 That isn’t to say that the PRA is completely ineffective at reducing 
burden. The PRA has almost certainly dissuaded agencies from pursuing some in-
formation collections.130 The high cost of pursuing public information collection 
necessarily means that some will be forgone, and one can assume that at least a 
portion of these forgone surveys would not have been cost-beneficial. Presumably, 
the renewal process encourages some agencies to streamline their information col-
lections or adopt electronic means of collection. Admittedly, it is impossible to 
judge the role the PRA process plays in this sort of modernization. However as 
Professor Funk noted in 1987, the benefit from identifying duplicative information 
collections is not likely to result in savings that drastically reduce the cost of pa-
 
 124. See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 13-14; Memorandum from John D. Graham, Adm’r, Execu-
tive Office of the President, White House Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Guidance on Agency  
Survey and Statistical Information Collections, 69 (Jan. 20, 2006), https://www.cio.noaa.gov/
itmanagement/pdfs/OMBSurveyGuidance_0106.pdf. 
 125. 5 C.F.R. § 1320.13(a), (d), (f). 
 126. Memorandum from Howard Shelanski, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Reg. Affairs, White 
House Office of Mgmt. and Budget, Flexibilities under the Paperwork Reduction Act for  
Compliance with Information Collection Requirements, 1 (July 22, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/pra_flexibilities_memo_7_22_16_finalI.pdf. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Stuart Shapiro, The Paperwork Reduction Act: Benefits, Costs and Directions for Reform, 30 
GOV’T INFO. Q. 204, 206 (2013). 
 129. Id.; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 2. 
 130. See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 27. 
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perwork for the public.131 Simply put, there isn’t enough duplicative data collection 
between federal agencies for this streamline to result in massive new burden sav-
ings. Certainly by 2018, one imagines that most of these easy savings have been 
identified. 
Perhaps the PRA is effective in improving the quality of information collec-
tion. The PRA provides the public with the opportunity to comment on proposed 
information collection activities, with some exceptions.132 Public participation, or 
at least the knowledge of its requirement, could improve information collection. 
But while one study found that in a two month period, sixty-three percent of regu-
lations put forward for notice and comment received public comments,133 a 2005 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report estimated that only around sev-
en percent of information collection activities receive public comments.134 Com-
ments tend to be concentrated around a few requests that are high-cost or connect-
ed to contentious rulemakings.135 This could be the fault of ineffectual outreach by 
agencies or OMB; the GAO report recommended that more be done.136 In the case 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking, studies have found that with few exceptions, 
comments are dominated by regulated industry, reflecting the public choice theory 
maxim that the costs of rulemaking are concentrated and the benefits diffuse.137 
This is, if anything, more likely to be the case for many information collections. As 
it stands, the limited public participation that does occur could improve those col-
lections, but it is unclear whether this benefit is worth the delay. 
OMB (and CIO) scrutiny and involvement might also improve information 
collection. OIRA corrects simple mistakes made by agencies and can encourage a 
set of government-wide best practices.138 Not all agencies have expertise in statisti-
cal or survey methods, and encouraging review might improve quality control.139 
 
 131. See Funk, supra note 13, at 111. 
 132. 44 U.S.C. § 3506(c)(2) (2017). 
 133. Stuart Shapiro, Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under the Clinton 
and Bush (43) Administrations, 23 J. OF L. & POL’Y 393, 404 (2007). 
 134. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-424, PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT: 
REDUCING BURDEN MAY REQUIRE A NEW APPROACH 24 (2005), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
250/246399.pdf. 
 135. SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 15. 
 136. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-424, supra note 134, at 5-6 (2005). 
 137. See Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical 
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 105-08 (2011). In a recent example 
of this phenomenon, the Securities and Exchange Commission chairman announced a new rule and 
cited letters from ‘Main Street investors’—letters that were in fact written as part of a public relations 
campaign from industry. Zachary Midler & Ben Elgin, SEC Chairman Cites Fishy Letters in Support of 
Policy Change, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-19/sec-
chairman-cites-fishy-letters-in-support-of-policy-change. 
 138. See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 13. 
 139. Shapiro, supra note 128, at 207. 
_JCI_CONDON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/25/2020  4:18 PM 
230 Michigan Journal of Administrative & Environmental Law [Vol. 9:1 
 
However, many agencies do have scientists trained in these fields.140 At agencies 
with regular experience running statistical surveys, their scientists and practitioners 
might have a better understanding of the constraints and techniques that make 
sense in their area than OMB desk officers. One study that interviewed federal ex-
perts on PRA effectiveness found that agencies with statistical expertise chafed at 
what they felt to be outdated statistical standards used by OIRA.141 Delay caused 
by justification and quibbling with OMB will be pure social cost in some contexts. 
Finally, the PRA requires calculation of public burden. These data force agen-
cies to consider the costs of information collection and can guide information man-
agement policies at agencies to manage their resources at a more socially optimal 
level. Agencies must design their survey instruments with the public burden in 
mind. On occasion, an agency might forgo a collection when confronted by the 
public burden it would generate in comparison to its usefulness to the agency (and 
by extension, to the public). 
This story would be more compelling were it clearer that the burden estimates 
agencies generate for information collections were accurate. Some scholars have 
criticized the methodologies used to calculate burden estimates as insufficiently 
accurate or realistic.142 The GAO has raised concerns about the rigor and useful-
ness of the estimates generated for OMB review.143 There is little in the way of 
process to test the accuracy of burden estimates if and when an information collec-
tion is reviewed. 
The failure of the PRA to meaningfully reduce the public burden of infor-
mation collection certainly is disappointing from the standpoint of reducing pa-
perwork, albeit understandable given the quantity of statutorily-driven paperwork 
mandates. But the costs generated by the PRA process are also significant.144 
C.  The Burden of the Paperwork Reduction Act on Agencies and the Public 
As is clear from the discussion of the operation of the PRA, getting approval 
for an information collection is difficult. At best, it takes a great deal of schedule 
time. Not merely an administrative burden, there are societal costs associated with 
the PRA regime. These come in the form of the literal costs faced by agencies to 
comply with the PRA, the delayed benefits from regulations and other agency ac-
tions, and the loss of forgone useful information collections. 
 
 140. See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 13-14. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 32; SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 21-22. 
 143. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-424, supra note 134, at 19-21. 
 144. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
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1.  Direct Costs 
The direct costs of the PRA are straightforward. Agencies face direct costs 
from the labor associated with preparing the paperwork required to receive OMB 
approval, and OMB itself bears the cost of evaluating requests from agencies. 
These costs should not be minimized. The labor burden associated with this addi-
tional administrative work either requires additional staff or simply pulls employ-
ees away from their main work. Information collections must be resubmitted every 
three years and require two public comment periods.145 A significant amount of 
administrative overhead is required to meet and implement these requirements. 
This costs taxpayers money and diverts attention from directly delivering the pro-
grams and regulations that the agency is substantively intended to provide. 
2.  Costs from Delay 
The indirect costs associated with delay may be even greater than direct costs. 
Agencies want to collect information for a reason. As discussed above, these rea-
sons are myriad: support rulemaking, understand the effectiveness of government 
programs, and improve the delivery of government programs.146 
Delayed collections mean delayed agency action. At a regulatory agency, this 
can mean a delay of a societally beneficial rule and a resulting loss of benefits. An 
agency might need the results of a study to justify a proposed rule to OMB or the 
courts. Assuming that enacted regulations have survived a cost-benefit analysis, the 
costs of delay may take the form of injuries, illnesses, or lost lives.147 
Delayed information collections also affect the government’s ability to deliver 
or improve services. Clearly, such delay reduces agency effectiveness, and the pub-
lic therefore either incurs costs from waste or forgoes benefit from optimized ser-
vices. Streamlined data collection would better inform a variety of agency deci-
sions, including not only where to develop new regulations, but also what programs 
or regulations could be cut back.148 In short, delayed information collection can 
blunt agency effectiveness. 
Finally, information collections can be beneficial simply through their useful-
ness to the public. Consider the wide variety of data the federal government makes 
 
 145. See discussion supra Section II.A.2. 
 146. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 147. See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 78 Fed. Reg. 
70416, 70468 (2013) (providing an analysis of benefits from lives saved from a new airbag rule). 
 148. Although there is no doubt that an earnest believer in lean government would appreciate 
rigorous procedure for information collections, she should be concerned that such procedure carries 
with it the possibility that delayed information collection can allow ineffective or actively costly gov-
ernment programs to run longer than they might otherwise. 
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available to the public that comes in via survey or reporting requirements.149 These 
surveys can be useful for academic purposes or for the broader public. In some cas-
es, the public availability of data provides a nudge to reporting industry to improve 
its behavior, or provides the body politic with the information needed to agitate for 
necessary lawmaking.150 If these collections are delayed, so are their benefits. 
3.  Costs From Forgone Information Collection 
Similarly, forgone information collections are costly. Just as with OIRA re-
view of regulations, review of information collections is biased in the negative: 
OIRA does not review agency inaction.151 To many, paperwork is a more obvious 
unmitigated bad than regulation.152 But to the extent that worthy or cost-beneficial 
collections are forgone because of the PRA, the Act imposes costs on the public. 
One can assume that information collections rejected by OMB are, indeed, 
unworthy. But the costs to an agency in putting forward an information collection, 
in terms of schedule delay and pure hassle, cause agencies to forgo information col-
lections that might otherwise provide useful benefits.153 These collections are not 
likely to be the sort of burdensome, mandatory reporting requirements considered 
by those who think of government paperwork, but the sort of voluntary surveys 
that can improve agency decision-making and program offerings.154 It simply may 
not be worth the time for a group of bureaucrats, even those at a research-focused 
agency, to spend a year of their time seeking OMB review for a study. 
It is also worth considering what replaces formal information collection when 
the PRA causes an agency to abandon that approach. After all, the need for data 
doesn’t disappear. The definition of information collection encourages agencies to 
limit their collections to nine or fewer interviews to avoid PRA requirements.155 
 
 149. See, e.g., Employment Situation, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (2019), https://www.bls.gov/
news.release/empsit.toc.htm (report released monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which includes 
the estimated unemployment rate and is sourced from two surveys of the public). 
 150. For an example of data reporting that has affected the supplying industry, see, e.g., The Col-
lege Scorecard, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2020). 
 151. The review process for information collections is, as with regulatory review, purely a nega-
tive check; a review of action only. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, 
Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L. J. 1337, 1377-79 (2013) (discussing the limited capacity of 
OMB review to overcome capture induced agency inaction in rulemaking). 
 152. Paperwork is a deadweight loss, while regulation is presumably cost-beneficial. See discus-
sion supra Section II.A. See also Thaler, supra note 22. 
 153. See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 27-28 (recounting interviews with federal officials describing 
forgone surveys and other research because of PRA delay and burden). 
 154. Congressionally mandated information collections will be higher priorities for agencies and 
have an easier time meeting OIRA review (as their justification is clear), while agencies are more likely 
to decide that the burden of justifying a voluntary survey (and the accompanying schedule delay) is not 
worth pursuing. 
 155. See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 27-28. 
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Such anecdotal data collection undoubtedly has the effect of limiting the usefulness 
and the accuracy of such studies.156 Agencies might also find themselves having to 
turn to regulated industry for data and information, the sort of behavior that raises 
popular concerns of agency capture.157 
Forgoing collection itself can make rulemaking challenging. Rulemaking re-
quires data to fine-tune requirements and to support required cost-benefit anal-
yses. In particular, the benefits of regulations can be particularly difficult to val-
ue.158 Hard-look review demands robust data to support rulemaking; and in an era 
of rigorous cost-benefit analysis, good data is needed to get rules approved within 
the Executive Branch as well.159 Forgoing data collection has the effect of under-
mining the functioning of agencies, their programming delivery, and the types of 
beneficial regulations they can propose and issue. 
4.  The PRA as a Political Tool 
Finally, although a centralized information collection hub at OMB provides 
some benefits, it also comes with costs inherent to OMB’s position within the 
White House. Much has been written about the effects of increased White House 
influence on the regulatory process via OMB from both sunny160 and dim161 views. 
While paperwork is a much less alluring target than regulation, information collec-
tion can also be subject to political manipulation. 
In 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) initiated 
a reporting requirement imposed on employers with more than 100 employees to 
submit data regarding gender pay equity—a goal in line with the political priorities 
of the Obama administration.162 The collection was approved by OMB in Septem-
ber of 2016.163 In 2017, the Trump administration’s OIRA Administrator initiated 
a review of the data collection and stayed the requirement, effectively excusing tar-
 
 156. A general principle of survey and qualitative research is that a larger sample reduces the 
error associated with sampling. See ROGER SAPSFORD, SURVEY RESEARCH 90-91 (2d ed. 2007). 
 157. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3 (1971) (describing the theory of agency capture). 
 158. See e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflection on the Relationship Between 
the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 352-53 (2014) (speculating 
about how the difficulty of conducting cost-benefit analyses on regulations contributes to trouble in 
advancing environmental regulations). 
 159. See id. 
 160. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: 
Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2013). 
 161. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 158 (responding to Sunstein, supra note 160). 
 162. Bernard Bell, “Equal Pay for Equal Work” & Overturning Close to “Midnight” Actions, 36 YALE 
J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 10, 2019), http://yalejreg.com/nc/equal-pay-for-equal-work-
overturning-close-to-midnight-actions/. 
 163. Id. 
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geted employers from having to comply with the reporting requirement.164 A dis-
trict court later reversed OIRA’s action as a violation of the APA, allowing the re-
porting requirement to go back into effect.165 OIRA had attempted to justify its 
review on procedural deficiencies in the EEOC’s information collection request.166 
It isn’t hard to see this in a political light, however. An administration opposed to 
an independent agency’s interpretation of its mission used the tools of the PRA to 
stop an information collection to which it was presumably ideologically opposed. 
Perhaps such interference is simply the exercise of a President’s prerogative to con-
trol the actions of executive agencies. But to the extent that agency action is to be 
based on reasoned, scientific judgment rather than political caprice,167 this use of 
the PRA is concerning. 
For some, reducing agency effectiveness might be a feature, not a bug. For 
those ideologically opposed to the administrative state, slowing its operations 
might itself be a social good.168 This is not to say that the intent behind the PRA 
was to add useless procedure to slow the operations of the administrative state. As 
discussed above, the available evidence suggests that the PRA was a well-
intentioned attempt at reducing the paperwork burden the public faces.169 Howev-
er, today there is widespread popular hostility to the administrative state that em-
braces additional and unnecessary proceduralism as a tool to slow what it perceives 
as harmful government action.170 For those who do believe that the administrative 
state delivers more good than bad, however, the burden the PRA places on agen-
cies appears likely to outweigh its benefits. 
 
 164. Memorandum from Neomi Rao, Admin., Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Victoria 
Lipnic, Acting Chair, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (Aug. 29, 2017). 
 165. Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. v. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 358 F. Supp. 3d. 66 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 166. Rao, supra note 164. 
 167. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opining that agency actions should be in-
formed by reasoned judgment rather than political gain). 
 168. There have been, for instance, a number of bills introduced by Congressional conservatives 
seeking to introduce significant procedure to prevent the adoption of significant rules. See, e.g., Regula-
tory Accountability Act of 2017, S. 951, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing the reintroduction of formal 
rulemaking, which passed the House in the 115th Congress). For further discussion of the Regulatory 
Accountability Act, see generally William Funk, Requiring Formal Rulemaking Is a Thinly Veiled Attempt to 
Halt Regulation, THE REG. REV., May 18, 2017, https://www.theregreview.org/2017/05/18/funk-formal-
rulemaking-halt-regulation/; see also Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2019), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347377 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3347377. 
 169. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
 170. See Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manu-
script at 5-6), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347377 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.3347377. 
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III.  PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
Two things are true: the PRA has been largely unsuccessful at reducing the 
paperwork burden agencies impose on the public, and largely successful at increas-
ing the paperwork burden within agencies. Regardless of which of these one finds a 
more pressing concern, some reform is needed. 
I propose largely eliminating the PRA. As evidenced, it has succeeded only in 
handicapping the effective administration of government with relatively little to 
show for it. When considered in light of the current state of administrative law, the 
PRA fits into the category of procedure that might appeal on the surface, but 
merely inhibits agency action to the ultimate detriment of the public good. This 
Part begins with an overview of previous proposals for reform of the PRA, before 
expanding on the proposal to largely eliminate the Act. 
A.  Prior Proposals for Reform 
There is relatively little scholarship on reforms to the PRA, but what has been 
proposed comes from two camps. First, there are those who believe the PRA is a 
toothless piece of legislation that needs more aggressive enforcement, including 
judicial review, to reduce the burden on the public.171 Second, there are those who 
agree that the PRA interferes unnecessarily with agency functioning and thus 
needs to be adapted to reduce the burden on agencies.172 I address these existing 
proposals below in turn. 
1.  Arguments for Modifying the PRA Regime to Add Enforcement 
A few academic proposals express concern that the PRA has been largely inef-
fective at reducing paperwork burden due to poor enforcement. By encouraging 
more robust review by OMB and the judiciary, they argue that the ends of the 
PRA might be more effectively achieved. There is more than a little truth to the 
notion that the PRA lacks teeth. Violations of the PRA have been historically 
commonplace, peaking at 800 in 1999 before dropping significantly in the 2000s—
rising again to 283 in 2016.173 Such violations are typically not punished with more 
than a stern letter from the OMB director. Interestingly, OMB itself appears out 
of compliance with the PRA. As of this writing, the agency has not published its 
 
 171. See, e.g., Andrew L. Levy, Comment, The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980: Unnecessary Bur-
dens and Unrealized Efficiency, 14 J. L. & COM. 99, 120-21 (1994). 
 172. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 8. 
 173. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, FISCAL YEAR 1999 
INFORMATION COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, at 269-305, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/assets/OMB/inforeg/icb-fy99.pdf; 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFFAIRS, 2016 INFORMATION 
COLLECTION BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 9, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/icb/icb_2016.pdf. 
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statutorily mandated Information Collection Budget document since the 2016 fis-
cal year.174 At a minimum, this delay could reflect the significant workload placed 
on OIRA. 
One proposal is for more robust judicial review of the PRA.175 One form this 
can take, as exemplified in the EEOC pay equity collection discussed earlier, is 
through increased use of the APA to review OIRA action.176 APA review of ac-
tions taken under the PRA rarely occurs today.177 Other means include more ro-
bust enforcement of the public protection clause discussed earlier, which exempts 
the public from penalties associated with noncompliant information collections.178 
One proposal is an exclusionary rule of sorts for the protection clause, where any 
information collected through noncompliant collections would be suppressed for 
use in enforcement proceedings.179 Although this might have the effect of incentiv-
izing agencies in narrow circumstances to better comply with the strictures of the 
PRA, courts have rejected such a theory because the clause is intended to protect 
the public, not disincentivize agency action.180 
Another proposal, put forward by Professor Sunstein, would have Congress 
amend the PRA to allow legal challenges to “arbitrary or capricious” approvals by 
OIRA.181 This would allow individuals to use the APA to challenge actions by gov-
ernment officials that are arbitrary or capricious in federal court.182 Professor Sun-
stein envisions judicial review as a vehicle for ensuring that agencies act in compli-
ance with the law and with the PRA, which he characterizes as creating 
“burden . . . that has not been minimized and has little practical utility.”183 
In other contexts, this judicial review has provided an important vehicle for 
regulated parties to ensure that executive actions are in line with their enabling 
statutes. But robust, “hard-look” judicial review has also led to concerns of agency 
ossification, where agencies are overly cautious because of the near-guaranteed le-
gal challenges to rules that are not supported by the communities they seek to reg-
 
 174. Author’s review of the Office of Management and Budget website. Despite data calls for the 
Fiscal Year 2017 and 2018 Information Collection Budgets, FY2016 is the most recent report available, 
perhaps reflecting the limited staff resources of OIRA for reviewing information collection requests. 
 175. See Levy, supra note 171, at 118-19 (1994). 
 176. See id. 
 177. See Bell, supra note 162, at n.14 (“In the D.C. Circuit, there appear to be only three cases 
since 1995 that challenge OMB’s actions or inaction under the Paperwork Reduction Act” (1) United to 
Protect Democracy v. Presidential Advisory Comm. on Election Integrity, 288 F. Supp. 3d 99 (D.D.C. 
2017); (2) Tozzi v. EPA, 148 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2001); (3) Public Citizen v. Lew, 127 F. Supp.2d 
1 (D.D.C. 2000)”). 
 178. 44 U.S.C. § 3512 (2012). See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 179. See Levy, supra note 171, at 116. 
 180. United States v. Takeo Matsumoto, 756 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (D. Haw. 1991). 
 181. Cass R. Sunstein, Sludge and Ordeals, 68 DUKE L. J. 1843, 1879 (2019). 
 182. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(b) (2017). 
 183. Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1878. 
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ulate.184 One can imagine that agencies and an OIRA facing the prospect of such 
particularized judicial review would be significantly more cautious in approving 
new surveys or information collection efforts, particularly where an information 
collection would affect a well-heeled regulated industry. For statutorily mandated 
collections, especially those that generate significant burdens like the FAFSA or 
tax returns, such review might generate worthy benefits, as Professor Sunstein en-
visions.185 But these proposals would almost certainly increase the costs from delay 
and forgone actions associated with the PRA, not to mention the significant litiga-
tion costs and burdens this would generate.186 
Professor Sunstein recommends additional amendments to the PRA that 
would change the extent of OIRA review.187 Among others, Professor Sunstein 
proposes requiring that the benefits of paperwork justify its costs, and that agencies 
be explicitly required to choose the most cost-effective means of achieving their 
information collection needs.188 
Such changes are, on their face, sensible. Agencies should design their infor-
mation collections with a healthy sense of economy and seek to continually im-
prove them to reduce the costs and burdens they place on the public. But in the 
case of information collection, a strict cost-benefit review does not make sense. It 
is difficult enough to monetize the intangible benefits of some environmental regu-
lations;189 the benefits of information collections are likely to be much more diffi-
cult to quantify. Professor Sunstein, recognizing this, characterizes such an exami-
nation as one of balancing the purposes of information collection and the costs 
imposed on the public.190 But even with that abstraction, the increased burden of 
justifying each proposed information collection would certainly lead to forgone 
 
 184. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on ‘Deossifying’ the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L. J. 
1385, 1391 (1992). For general discussion on the extent and causes of agency ossification, see JERRY L. 
MASHAW ET. AL., ADMIN. L., 783-96 (7th ed. 2014). 
 185. See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1878. 
 186. This impact could have a particular valence. Suppose an agency seeks to survey an industry 
to glean information that could be used at a later date to support rulemaking that the industry opposes. 
That regulated industry would have essentially two opportunities to challenge that action legally. The 
prospect of such challenge might very well further the extent of ossification, where agencies daunted by 
the effort required to sustain their actions in the court forgo not only the regulation but also their re-
search and data gathering functions. See McGarity, supra note 184, at 1391; Mashaw et. al., supra at 783-
96. 
 187. See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1879-81. 
 188. Id. at 1879-80. 
 189. See discussion supra accompanying note 158. 
 190. See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1881. One of the faults of cost-benefit analysis is the chal-
lenge associated with properly estimating benefits that are difficult to quantify. Without further re-
search (sometimes the sort that requires OIRA clearance under OIRA) to provide mechanisms to meas-
ure benefits, the cost-benefit analysis can disincentivize the pursuit of actions that have less measurable 
benefits. One could easily imagine this encompassing information collection. 
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surveys and generalized delays in new collections, increasing the paperwork burden 
internally and disincentivizing government action. 
Professor Sunstein’s proposals fall into the trap of “proceduralism” described 
by Professor Nicholas Bagley.191 Professor Sunstein argues for these improvements 
as a way to increase the effectiveness of government programs by decreasing the 
administrative hurdles to participation.192 His means at achieving these worthy 
goals, however, involve massively increasing the procedural burden agencies face 
when they try to act. This fits Professor Bagley’s description of “proceduralism” on 
the political left: those supportive of government action broadly, who agree with 
increasing administrative procedure as a means of protecting against abuses of 
power by Executive Branch bureaucrats.193 
Professor Bagley argues that those on the left who are supportive of such in-
creased procedure both underestimate the costs associated with that procedure and 
the extent to which procedure is used by the right as an explicit tool of limiting the 
administrative state.194 First, conservatives who oppose the functioning of the ad-
ministrative state have proposed legislation that would provide drastically in-
creased procedural hurdles for agencies with the explicit goal of making it harder 
for agencies to enact their statutory missions.195 But even procedure that lacks such 
an explicit ideological valence (such as the PRA) has that very effect, making it 
harder for the administrative state to enact rules and take action to protect the 
public’s safety and wellbeing.196 Although well-meaning, requiring strict judicial 
review and enhanced cost-benefit analysis would serve to drastically increase the 
procedure required for information collection in ways that would be detrimental to 
the functioning of government and to the public good. 
2.  Arguments for Modifying the PRA Regime to  
Reduce the Burden on Agency Functioning 
The most comprehensive recent examinations of the Paperwork Reduction 
Act are a series of papers by Professor Stuart Shapiro. Professor Shapiro was hired 
by the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) to understand the 
effect of the PRA.197 His report was released in two stages: a first draft that in-
 
 191. See generally Bagley, supra note 170, at 3. 
 192. See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 1850-51. His example of voter registration is one of wholly 
unnecessary administrative burden placed on the public, albeit one largely outside the control of the 
federal government (and by extension, the PRA). 
 193. See Bagley, supra note 170, at 4-5. 
 194. See generally id. 
 195. See discussion supra at note 168. 
 196. See discussion supra at Section II.C. 
 197. SHAPIRO, supra note 8. 
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cluded proposals for Congressional change,198 and a final report focusing on admin-
istrative changes.199 The second report led to a set of proposed administrative rec-
ommendations directed at OIRA to improve the speed and effectiveness with 
which it can process information collection requests.200 This includes: the increased 
use of expedited clearance procedures, such as the use of generic clearances and fast 
track procedures adopted by the Obama administration OIRA; improved training 
and distribution of information from OIRA to agencies on how to submit infor-
mation requests; refining the required supporting statement agencies must submit 
with a proposed information collection; and improving the computer system used 
to submit and track information collection requests.201 All are worthwhile sugges-
tions that could reduce the costs associated with delay and forgone information re-
quests. However, in large part because these proposals operate within the structure 
of the current statute, they are in total, small improvements that would have only a 
minor impact on the identified costs of the PRA. 
Professor Shapiro’s original suggestions for statutory change would provide 
greater benefit by reducing bureaucracy. He advocated for amending the PRA to 
increase the time between renewals from three to five years.202 This would signifi-
cantly decrease the annual load for both agencies and OIRA and would do so for a 
category of approvals that, in his view, sees little improvement from the PRA pro-
cess.203 His second proposal, echoing a prior GAO recommendation,204 was to 
eliminate the initial sixty-day comment period before an agency submits an infor-
mation collection request to OMB.205 He argues that the later thirty-day comment 
period serves the same purpose, and that significant delay and little benefit occurs 
from a second bite at the apple for commenters.206 Finally, he proposes altering the 
statutory requirements for the Information Collection Budget report to Congress, 
specifically eliminating the annual request for information from agencies them-
selves.207 He notes that this information is generally available on OIRA’s webpage 
on information requests (reginfo.gov), that the report as published is not useful to 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. STUART SHAPIRO, PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT EFFICIENCIES, ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (May 14, 2018), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/paperwork-reduction-act-efficiencies-final-report.pdf. 
 200. ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT EFFICIENCIES 
PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION (June 14, 2018), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
paperwork-reduction-act-efficiencies-recommendation-for-plenary.pdf. 
 201. Id. 
 202. SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 39. 
 203. Id. at 38-39 (Professor Shapiro assumes that most benefits of OIRA review come from new, 
rather than renewed, information collection requests.). 
 204. Id. at 42. 
 205. Id. at 40-41. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 42-44. 
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the general public or OMB, and that it serves as unnecessary paperwork for agen-
cies and OIRA alike.208 These proposals are, as with the administrative changes, all 
worthy. All would serve to reduce some of the burden and public cost generated by 
the PRA. Yet all generated controversy at the related ACUS committee meeting 
such that they were not formally adopted.209 But even these proposals are all mar-
ginal changes that would still result in forgone information collection and signifi-
cant delay. 
B.  Eliminating the Paperwork Reduction Act 
As outlined, the PRA generates relatively few benefits. To be fair, it offers the 
potential for improvement in the rigor of new and existing information collections, 
encourages the collection of data on paperwork burdens, and forces agencies to for-
go some information collections that are undoubtedly not cost beneficial. But the 
net benefit of these attributes is minimal, and it has not succeeded in a meaningful 
way at its namesake goal—reducing paperwork. At the same time, it generates a 
significant amount of paperwork for agencies. Agencies face processing times rang-
ing from six months to a year for developing information collection requests from 
duplicative and underutilized commenting processes and a severely understaffed 
OIRA.210 Despite the PRA’s intent to eliminate and streamline mandatory report-
ing, such collections include voluntary surveys and other data collections that are 
unlikely to impose a significant burden on industry or the public.211 
I propose eliminating the bulk of the PRA. Specifically, information collection 
requests should no longer need to be submitted to OIRA for review.212 Agencies 
should still retain internal functions to oversee paperwork burdens, but the OIRA 
approval processes and notice-and-comment procedures would be eliminated. 
This repeal would have a number of benefits. First and most obviously, agen-
cies would more easily be able to collect data. This would be particularly beneficial 
for voluntary collections. Agencies would be able to pursue statistical surveys and 
other forms of research to support rulemaking and program evaluation simply and 
easily. They would be able to respond to changing conditions or emergencies more 
simply. This would lead to more accurate and well-supported rulemaking and 
would streamline program delivery and efficiency. 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. Shapiro, supra note 199, at 30. Professor Shapiro is not explicit about what the controversy 
was regarding. One could imagine a) disagreement at what appropriate statutory revisions should be, b) 
disagreement regarding the propriety of offering statutory recommendations, or c) a reluctance to offer 
suggestions that might “weaken” the PRA. 
 210. See discussion supra at notes 8-10. 
 211. See discussion supra at Section II.A.1. 
 212. Of course, the PRA created OIRA, and so OIRA’s statutory mandate would need to be pre-
served to include its primary modern and largely non-statutory function: the review of agency action 
under Exec. Order 12866. 
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Such a change would also free up resources. OIRA would be able to prioritize 
rulemaking review, speeding the process of promulgating societally beneficial rules 
(and removing rules that are no longer cost-beneficial). Agencies would be able to 
move resources currently devoted to the administrative burden of PRA review to 
other types of knowledge management functions and work directly related to their 
mandates. Eliminating these direct costs would have significant benefit across the 
federal government. 
To be sure, some of the benefits of the PRA would be lost. Mandatory report-
ing requirements would be easier to implement, which would come at a cost to 
regulated entities. However, such requirements are often subject to a form of 
OIRA review as rulemakings already, minimizing the change.213 Further, such a 
change would recognize the fact that most mandatory reporting requirements are 
driven by statute and Congressional interest. Take the example of industry lobby-
ing around tax returns.214 Ultimately, many of the drivers of paperwork burden are 
out of the hands of agencies; eliminating the burden of PRA requirements would 
acknowledge this. 
Some of the initial benefits of the PRA, such as the elimination of duplicative 
collections, may be lost. This could be mitigated by encouraging agencies to main-
tain an internal review of mandatory paperwork burdens and periodically conduct 
reviews of burden. But even without this, eliminating the PRA would not change 
the political unpopularity of mandatory information collection. Administrations 
have long decried paperwork associated with the administrative state;215 agencies 
would still have to contend with substantial political pressure to reduce the burden 
associated with information collection even without a PRA review process. 
The public would lose its constructive ability to comment on proposed infor-
mation collections. But as discussed above, such commenting is rarely utilized. 
Like agency notice-and-comment, it is not unreasonable to assume that the majori-
ty of commenting parties are regulated entities.216 Such organizations cannot be 
said to lack the sort of political influence to seek statutory changes on the mandates 
that generate reporting requirements in the first place, or pressure administrations 
to reduce burdens they dislike. 
Finally, without OMB review, the rigor of information collection may suffer 
slightly. The extent to which OMB review improves the quality of information 
collections is contested.217 But certainly, in marginal cases, there may be a decline 
in quality. However, agencies collect information for a reason. They have intrinsic 
incentives to make sure such collection is accurate and well-supported, and many 
surveys are put forward by trained statisticians and other professionals across the 
 
 213. See discussion supra at Section II.A.1. 
 214. See discussion supra at Section I.A. 
 215. See discussion supra at Section I.C. 
 216. See supra note 134. 
 217. See SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 31. 
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federal government. Eliminating the current overlay of OMB review is unlikely to 
substantially affect the quality of government statistical research. 
• • • • • 
Eliminating the PRA would broadly increase the efficiency of the federal gov-
ernment. It would enable agencies to collect the information they need to properly 
fulfill their statutory mandates. On its face, the PRA might appear to be the sort of 
sensible procedure that protects the public from inept government requirements 
that would otherwise burden the public. In fact, it does little but hobble the func-
tioning of agencies pursuing worthy goals. The current regime of ineffectively reg-
ulating paperwork with ever more paperwork should end. 
